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Executive summary 
The conflict in Syria has prompted renewed calls for so-called ‘safe zones’ and ‘safe corridors’ to 
prevent people from needing to seek protection abroad as refugees, and to encourage refugees to 
return home. Given the inherent dangers that arise from trying to leave a conflict zone and 
travelling onwards to seek asylum, the idea of creating safe zones within States has been put 
forward as a positive humanitarian alternative. Yet, there are a number of legal and practical 
preconditions that must be met for safety to be guaranteed.   
 
The reality of conflict today means that in all but the most extreme circumstances – where flight is 
impossible – safe zones cannot be a substitute for asylum in another country. They may be the 
best response to people trapped in a conflict zone, but that is all. They do not provide true 
‘protection’ as envisaged by international refugee law. Furthermore, the law is underdeveloped and 
the practice is too erratic and random for safe zones to be a proper response to a humanitarian 
crisis. If States in the global north want to spare refugees the dangers of irregular flight, they should 
establish proper pathways to safety through humanitarian and migration channels, and push for 
peace in those areas of the world where conflict is rife.
1
 Safe corridors could provide that route out 
– as well as operating to allow those trapped in conflict zones to carry on with their lives by safely 
accessing work, education, markets and health care, to the extent possible. 
 
This policy brief begins by asking some fundamental questions about safe zones and safe 
corridors, and sketching the complexity of the international legal frameworks that apply. It then 
briefly examines the history of the law and practice of safe zones and safe corridors, before 
analysing the preconditions to their creation, their qualities and character, how they are accessed, 
and how protection and other human rights can be assured. Finally, it considers the responsibility 
and accountability of various international actors with respect to safe zones and safe corridors. 
 
The existence of different terms to describe the concepts, and the interplay of several different  
sub-branches of international law, make the analysis more complicated, but the conclusion 
reached is that in all but the most extreme circumstances – where flight is impossible – safe zones 
can never provide a substitute for asylum. They cannot provide the same degree of protection that 
a safe third country can. By contrast, safe corridors can enable people to flee to a place of safety, 
and at the very least can help those unable to leave by facilitating access to vital services. 
 
This policy brief makes the following core findings: 
 
 Safe zones are sometimes the only way to guarantee safety to people unable to leave a 
conflict zone. In those circumstances, drawing on practice that has developed around 
refugee camps and new ‘protection of civilian’ peacekeeping mandates, safe zones should 
be neutral, demilitarised and humanitarian in nature. Previous practice indicates that they 
work best if they are consensual rather than imposed from outside. Where they are the 
only means of providing people with some level of security, special regard must be had to 
their creation, to access, to ensuring continued protection, to facilitating the rights of those 
living there, and to issues of responsibility and accountability of all relevant actors if they 
are to be at all meaningful. 
 
 Safe zones are, at best, the least worst alternative. They do not provide true protection as 
envisaged by international refugee law. The law on safe zones is underdeveloped and 
State practice is too erratic for them to be considered a proper response to humanitarian 
crises. The idea that States in the global north might seek to impose safe zones as a 
means of discouraging would-be refugees from fleeing (on the basis that they protect them 
from the dangers associated with irregular movement) is disingenuous. Active measures to 
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seek peace must be the objective of States, rather than trapping people in safe zones at 
the mercy of parties to a conflict. Safe zones should never be seen as places to which 
refugees could be returned (for example, through the application of the internal 
flight/protection alternative). 
 
 Safe zones must guarantee the following minimum rights: 
 
o the right to life (through the principle of distinction); 
o the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; 
o freedom from arbitrary recruitment (to participate in the conflict); 
o personal security, particularly in relation to sexual- and gender-based violence; 
o the right to the highest attainable standard of living and health; 
o access to humanitarian relief and assistance, and access by humanitarian 
organisations; and 
o freedom of movement, including the right to leave the country and seek asylum (with 
full respect for the principle of non-refoulement). 
 
 Safe corridors may provide useful avenues to protection and assistance. They will enable 
some people to leave the conflict zone as safely as possible. They may also facilitate 
access to essential services, such as markets, health care, employment and education. 
However, to be effective all parties to the conflict must uphold the safe corridors. 
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1 Introduction 
The first hundred days of 2017 saw 664 people die crossing the Mediterranean trying to reach 
Europe.
2
 It is unknown how many died crossing the Sahara trying to reach the north African coast. 
It is little wonder, therefore, that the idea of establishing safe zones and safe corridors in the hope 
that people will not have to risk their lives fleeing conflict and generalised violence came to the 
political fore. There were discussions between Germany and Turkey;
3
 statements by the United 
States about creating safe zones and ‘interim zones of stability’;
4
 and a proposal by Russia, Turkey 
and Iran as part of the Astana talks on Syria in May 2017 to create ‘de-escalation zones’ inside 
Syria, which Russian military officials suggested would encourage refugees to return.
5
 By contrast, 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, said he could not see how such safe 
zones would work.
6
 
 
Safe zones, if properly established, allow civilians to remain in a conflict zone and avoid the 
inherent dangers associated with leaving and then transiting to other countries in search of asylum. 
The numbers who drown or are abused by people smugglers alone suggests that safe zones could 
be a humanitarian solution. Alternatively, where flight is the only viable option, safe corridors can 
reduce the risks of leaving an area of conflict. They can also provide other means to facilitate 
protection, such as enabling people to move between different parts of safe zones, and to access 
vital services. 
 
The situation is more complex, though, not only in terms of the range of different laws that apply, 
but also in relation to the motivations behind such calls. While finding ways to stop people from 
having to take perilous journeys in the hope of finding safety is surely positive,
7
 it can only be so if 
protection is actually available in the safe zone. One might also ask to what extent the call for safe 
zones is motivated by a desire to reduce the number of asylum seekers travelling to Europe and 
elsewhere, compared to a humanitarian impulse to assist people to remain closer to their homes.
8
  
1.1 What are ‘safe zones’ and ‘safe corridors’? 
There is no agreed terminology, let alone an agreed definition, for ‘safe zones’ (which is the term 
used in this policy brief). ‘Safety zones’, ‘safe havens’, ‘neutralised zones’ or ‘open cities’ (that is, 
undefended towns) have all been used at different times. The most recent term is ‘de-escalation 
zones’.
9
 Some of these terms have been described in treaties, but in each case, that has been for 
a specific purpose. In other words, what makes these areas ‘safe’ is not agreed in international law. 
The same is true of ‘safe corridors’. 
 
A ‘safe zone’ suggests an area within a country engulfed in armed conflict or generalised violence 
that is made safe from military attack. The idea is that those within the zone can live there safely, 
protected from the impacts of the conflict (such as accessing work or education and being able to 
obtain necessary foodstuffs and medicines).  
 
A ‘safe corridor’ refers either to a route out of the conflict for civilians and non-fighters, or, in the 
midst of conflict, a way to move around (such as a corridor that allows people to go to a market 
once a week or to reach a hospital from a village).  
 
Safe corridors may be a necessary concomitant to safe zones: otherwise, how can safety be 
assured for those within the zone if humanitarian organisations cannot get in and provide essential 
supplies and services? The corridor may also provide a means of escape if the zone ceases to be 
safe. Nevertheless, even if there is no safe zone, it may be possible to establish safe corridors.  
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This policy brief deals with both safe zones and safe corridors. While there are theoretical and 
practical linkages between the two, there are also several distinctions. Part 2 begins by setting out 
fundamental questions regarding safe zones and safe corridors, particularly the complexity of the 
legal frameworks that apply in international law. Part 3 then briefly examines the history of the law 
and practice of safe zones and safe corridors. Part 4 explores their creation, qualities and 
character, how they are accessed, and the means of ensuring protection and other human rights. 
Finally, Part 5 considers the responsibility and accountability of various international actors with 
respect to safe zones and safe corridors. 
 
 
2 Fundamental questions and challenges 
Before discussing the policy questions relating to safe zones and corridors, it is necessary to set 
out the various legal frameworks at play. Their interaction should lead to the complementary 
provision of protection rather than limiting the guarantees under each of the different sub-branches 
of international law.  
 
As stated above, there is no accepted definition of a ‘safe zone’ or a ‘safe corridor’ in international 
law. Different sub-branches of international law give indications of the criteria necessary for a safe 
zone to be established, but none provides a clear set of principles. However, since people flee 
armed conflicts and generalised violence in search of protection, a safe zone should offer a 
minimum level of protection if it is to meet the needs and rights of those living there. 
2.1 International refugee law 
The Refugee Convention predicates refugee status on people being unable to avail themselves of 
the protection of their country of nationality.
10
 In theory, that still allows for the possibility of an 
internal flight/protection alternative (i.e. relocating to another part of the country). Given that safe 
zones are posited as places to which would-be refugees could go in the first place instead of 
fleeing abroad, and as places to which refugees abroad might return, they must by analogy meet 
the criteria for an internal flight/protection alternative. Among other things, this means that people 
must be able to ‘lead a relatively normal life without facing undue hardship’.
11
 If that is not possible, 
then it is not reasonable to expect a person to remain or return to a safe zone. In particular, it is 
unclear how permanent safe zones are meant to be. 
 
While international refugee law does not provide much guidance about what else is required for a 
zone to be considered safe, other sub-branches of international law help to fill this gap – especially 
human rights law, considered below.  
 
As for safe corridors, international refugee law has little to say that is directly on point. However, 
the right to seek asylum in article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
necessarily requires that States do not close their borders to those seeking protection as 
refugees.
12
 
2.2 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
In this context, it is also important to mention the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
13
 
Although themselves non-binding, they ‘reflect and are consistent with international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law’.
14
 They set out a useful set of minimum standards that 
apply when people are displaced within their own country, and are therefore relevant where people 
have been forced to move to a safe zone. These standards are relevant not only in relation to 
actions taken by States, but also to those by ‘all other authorities, groups and persons in their 
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relations with internally displaced persons’ and ‘[i]ntergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations when addressing internal displacement’.
15
  
2.3 The law of armed conflict 
The law of armed conflict has had the greatest influence on safe zones and safe corridors.
16
 Prior 
to World War II, there were examples of safe havens created for civilians, albeit without a legal 
framework to regulate them.
17
 Between 1949 and 1977, the limited law that did exist related only to 
conflicts between two or more countries (international armed conflicts), although parties to so-
called civil wars (non-international armed conflicts) could negotiate similar arrangements. 
 
Additional Protocol 1 (AP1) of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions advanced the law by providing for 
the general protection of civilians, requiring that in international armed conflicts, all civilians ‘enjoy 
general protection against dangers arising from military operations’ and shall not be the object of 
attack.
18
 This is clearly relevant to safe zones. While the protection of civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts under Additional Protocol 2 (AP2) – which applies to non-international armed 
conflicts – is not as strong, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has asserted that 
the principal elements of AP1 and Geneva Convention IV are recognised as customary 
international law and are therefore applicable, for the most part, in non-international armed conflicts 
as well.
19
  
 
Indeed, for the purposes of the analysis below, the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Rules best set out how safe zones and safe corridors might be established more generally in 
the context of refugee protection. As with all other aspects of the law of armed conflict in this 
context, it is as much about the set of conditions necessary for safe zones and corridors to be 
respected by the parties, as it is about the specific rule. The law of armed conflict can provide 
guidance for safe zones and corridors in the context of refugee protection, but it is not, on its own, 
the only applicable law. Therefore, for the purposes of refugee protection under international law, 
safe zones and safe corridors must have an autonomous meaning that goes beyond what the law 
of armed conflict provides. 
2.4 International human rights law 
International human rights law also establishes parameters for safe zones and safe corridors – a 
zone can only be safe if certain human rights are ensured to those within it, including: the right to 
life; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment; and the right to the highest attainable standards of health. Nevertheless, 
with respect to certain rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), while the threshold is high, States can, if publicly declared, derogate ‘in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation … provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’.
20
 By contrast, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the almost universally ratified 
Convention on the Rights of the Child contain no derogation clause for national emergencies.
21
 
 
One particular human right that is pertinent in cases of displacement, safe zones and safe corridors 
is the right to freedom of movement.
22
 This is a right from which States can derogate in time of 
emergency. However, if other States – such as those not involved in the conflict but possibly 
receiving refugees from it – were to impose a safe zone in the conflict zone, those States could 
never rely on Article 4 to limit freedom of movement – there is no threat to the life of the nation in 
those States.  
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With respect to safe corridors, the right to freedom of movement is one that can bolster the 
argument for ensuring access to goods and services for those trapped, and even for the right to 
seek protection abroad. 
2.5 Peacekeeping operations 
The international law relating to peacekeeping operations also has a direct bearing on protection in 
safe zones. Sometimes consensual, sometimes imposed, the UN has, almost since its inception, 
put third States’ troops on the ground to maintain international peace and security. For instance, in 
1991, the UN Security Council insisted Iraq ‘allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organizations’ and requested ‘the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, 
including those of the relevant [UN] agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees 
and displaced Iraqi population’.
23
 This does not conform to the traditional model of safe zones 
where the parties to the conflict agree that a particular location will not be subject to attack. The 
UN-created safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina simply trapped Bosnian Muslim males – 7000 
were murdered in Srebrenica alone despite the UN Protection Force and member States 
possessing a mandate to deter attacks through the use of force.
24
 There was a similar experience 
with ‘secure humanitarian areas’ in Rwanda.
25
 The ‘Protection of Civilians’ sites set up in South 
Sudan, even with authorisation by the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to 
use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians, create conditions for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, and monitor and investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, are attacked regularly.
26
 
2.6 The responsibility of States and international organisations 
Finally, underpinning the discussion above is the international law pertaining to State responsibility 
and the responsibility of international organisations. Ultimately, the protection of individuals 
depends on the State and other international actors upholding the substantive laws examined. 
Where they fail to do so, the rule of law demands that they are held accountable and that remedies 
are available to those affected. For instance, how can individuals who commit international crimes 
against those in safe zones be prosecuted, how can the victims obtain reparations, and should 
reparations be available from rebel groups and the UN if they are at fault? A lack of accountability 
by any of the relevant actors undermines the protection that safe zones should accord. 
2.7 Concluding remarks  
Given this broad legal framework, several overarching questions emerge. Are they a temporary 
measure until flight across a border (or to somewhere safe internally) can be achieved, or are they 
an effective form of long-term protection? Are calls by States in the global north to establish safe 
zones wholly humanitarian, or motivated by a desire to protect their own borders? Given the 
political character of some safe zones, how far does that challenge the non-political, neutral 
mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)?
27
 For instance, if a 
safe zone were created by the Security Council without a State’s consent, that could lead to 
operational difficulties for UNHCR. And if a safe zone were to obstruct the individual’s right to seek 
asylum elsewhere, then this could be seen as inherently inimical to UNHCR’s mandate to provide 
international protection to refugees. 
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3 An overview of safe zones and safe corridors 
This part of the policy brief should be read in light of two basic premises.  
 
First, safe zones and safe corridors are only as safe as the parties to the conflict allow them to be. 
They are not, and never can be, a guarantee of safety, but for various reasons, they may be the 
best that is available, especially if the international community is not succeeding in promoting 
peace.  
 
Secondly, declaring an area as a ‘safe zone’ does not reduce the protection owed to individuals 
located outside it. In other words, the existence of a safe zone should not imply that other localities 
are necessarily ‘unsafe’. The law pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts or 
generalised violence is ubiquitous: safe zones and safe corridors are areas where one can expect 
heightened levels of protection akin to what one might expect in peacetime.  
 
One of the fundamental tenets of the law of armed conflict is the principle of distinction, namely that 
civilians and non-fighters – that is, those not participating in the conflict – cannot be the object of an 
attack. The parties to the conflict should instead target military objectives. While collateral damage 
cannot be wholly avoided, the aim is always to minimise this risk. If these rules were followed at all 
times, then safe zones might be effective – when coupled with a guarantee of access for 
humanitarian assistance, relief and supplies, and the fulfilment of human rights standards for those 
in the zone. To this end, lessons can be learned from past examples of safe zones which highlight 
certain criteria that ought to be met to achieve the greatest chance of protection for those within 
them.
28
 
3.1 Enhancing safety 
One way of enhancing security within safe zones and safe corridors is to establish them 
consensually. This means that the parties to the conflict mutually agree to their establishment, with 
agreed conditions and a sense that the safe zone or corridor creates benefits for all concerned. A 
safe zone or corridor might also be declared unilaterally, and if that call is adopted by other parties 
to the conflict, then the prospect of success is greater.  
 
Success will also depend on lines of communication being maintained throughout the conflict, 
which is more difficult in multi-party conflicts (and particularly in non-international armed conflicts). 
The role of protecting powers or international humanitarian organisations (such as the ICRC or 
UNHCR, both of which have extensive field presences and should have access to all individuals of 
concern) will also be crucial.  
 
Where safe zones were declared in the past by the Security Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Rwanda, there were significant shortcomings – a lesson that should be borne in mind given 
proposals by the European Union (EU), the United States and the Astana process, referred to 
above. Indeed, when safe zones are imposed on a State without its consent, the lives of civilians 
as well as international humanitarian officials may be put at risk: international humanitarian actors 
have no right of access to a State (or even to all parts of the State where they are lawfully 
operating), even if they are meant to be able to reach all affected individuals of concern.  
 
If safe zones are to be created consensually, then they need to fulfil criteria that are seen as posing 
little or no risk to the parties to the conflict. Clearly, they must be humanitarian in character, and 
relief and assistance should be provided in an impartial manner. But many other questions remain 
unclear. Do they need to be demilitarised? Can they be neutral? Can strategic locations ever be 
safe zones, such as a town that straddles a river? Is it ever possible to guarantee absolutely that a 
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safe corridor will at all times be demilitarised, or are there acceptable degrees of demilitarisation? 
Is a politically-motivated safe zone, such as one established to reduce the number of people 
seeking protection in the global north, ever more than an internment camp wrapped up in pious 
hope?  
 
Against this backdrop, the following section considers the law and practice relating to the creation 
of safe zones and corridors; access to these areas; ensuring that safe zones are protected; 
ensuring access to rights in safe zones; and issues of responsibility and accountability. 
 
 
4 The characteristics of safe zones and safe corridors 
4.1 Creation 
The legal characteristics of safe zones and safe corridors were discussed above, drawing on the 
principles of the law of armed conflict. In addition, ideas such as neutrality, humanitarian character 
and demilitarisation can be derived from international refugee law and the Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement. Indeed, at one level, safe zones resemble refugee camps, so the linkages 
possess a practical validity. UNHCR’s Executive Committee (ExCom), comprised of States, has 
established criteria for refugee camps to ensure refugees’ safety.
29
 The starting point is ExCom 
Conclusion No 48 (XXXVIII) of 1987: 
 
Predicating this Conclusion on the assumption, inter alia, that refugee camps and 
settlements have an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character and on the principle that 
the grant of asylum or refuge is a peaceful and humanitarian act that is not to be regarded as 
unfriendly by another State; hoping to assist in guaranteeing the safety of refugees and 
asylum-seekers, as well as to reinforce their rights, obligations and responsibilities and those 
of States and international organizations pursuant to relevant rules and principles of 
international law; and underlining that the rights and responsibilities of States pursuant to the 
Charter of the United Nations and relevant rules and principles of international law, including 
international humanitarian law, remained unaltered.
30
  
 
While the Conclusion assumes that refugee camps are located across a border and that the people 
in it are refugees, the same principles apply by analogy to safe zones within a State where an 
armed conflict is occurring. While it is certainly easier to maintain the non-political and neutral 
character of a camp when it is located beyond a conflict zone in another country, decades of 
experience with camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) suggests that the ideas are 
transposable.  
 
ExCom Conclusion No 94 (LIII) of 2002 provides the greatest guidance on the nature of refugee 
camps and, by analogy, the characteristics of safe zones. Promulgated after UNHCR’s experience 
in the former Yugoslavia and in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, it provides ‘that all actors, 
including refugees themselves, have the obligation to cooperate in ensuring the peaceful and 
humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements’.
31
 Furthermore, camps, and thus safe 
zones, can best demonstrate their humanitarian, neutral, demilitarised and civilian character if 
there are no armed elements in the camp, if no recruitment or training by any party to the conflict 
takes place, and if they are not mixed with populations of internees or prisoners of war. All this 
might seem obvious, but in an on-going armed conflict, it may prove difficult to preserve these 
important preconditions in safe zones.
32
 
 
Most recently, States emphasised in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 
that: 
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host States have the primary responsibility to ensure the civilian and humanitarian character 
of refugee camps and settlements. We will work to ensure that this character is not 
compromised by the presence or activities of armed elements and to ensure that camps are 
not used for purposes that are incompatible with their civilian character. We will work to 
strengthen security in refugee camps and surrounding local communities, at the request and 
with the consent of the host country.
33
 
 
These ideas are complemented by the obligations of parties to the conflict in relation to neutralised 
zones, non-defended localities and demilitarised zones.
34
 In neutralised zones, civilians may take 
no part in hostilities or perform work of a military character. Non-defended localities and 
demilitarised zones must be free from all combatants and ‘no acts of hostility shall be committed … 
by the population’.
35
 More generally, according to the ICRC, there is customary international law 
that prohibits parties to a conflict ‘directing an attack against a zone established to shelter … 
civilians from the effects of hostilities’.
36
 The obligation not to attack zones, however described, or 
any civilian population anywhere
37
 lies at the core of the law of armed conflict that would make safe 
zones a viable alternative to flight along insecure pathways to distant places of protection. As will 
be seen, however, the possibility to seek asylum must never be denied, and these criteria for safe 
zones must be recognised for what they are: a second best alternative to obtaining protection 
outside the conflict zone. 
 
As for safe corridors, there is little express law. As such, the minimum preconditions for safety must 
be derived from obligations to permit access (discussed below) and general rules on the protection 
of the civilian population, as set out in AP1. As noted above, safe corridors perform a separate 
function from safe zones: they allow for the movement of people (possibly those living in safe 
zones) to other areas. This may enable them to access markets or health care services, for 
instance. Safe corridors may be accessible all the time or only at certain times of the day or on 
certain days of the week (such as market day). Given their more ephemeral, less regulated nature, 
it would be more difficult to enforce them being wholly civilian or demilitarised, although their 
humanitarian character should be evident lest they become a military target. With greater access to 
mobile technology and the internet,
38
 it is possible that safe corridors could be remotely monitored 
and controlled so as to ensure their humanitarian character (with proper respect for privacy and 
data management).  
 
Safe corridors can also help safe zones to function more effectively, since it is clear that the more 
that people in safe zones can access services and goods as normal, the more one can accept their 
utility where there is no secure alternative outside the conflict zone. 
4.2 Access to safe zones and safe corridors 
4.2.1 Humanitarian assistance 
Safe zones can only be sustained if there are safe corridors that guarantee access for 
humanitarian organisations providing protection and assistance. For a safe zone to be able to 
function and provide any acceptable degree of protection, humanitarian actors need to be able to 
reach individuals of concern, including by being able to deliver humanitarian aid and assistance. 
However, no binding international law instrument expressly guarantees a right to the delivery of 
food, medical supplies or other basic essentials. AP1 and AP2 both make limited provision in 
relation to humanitarian assistance,
39
 but neither establishes a right to access such supplies. 
Under AP1, relief actions are ‘subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned’.
40
 Under AP2, 
where a civilian population is suffering ‘undue hardship’, exclusively humanitarian and impartial 
relief actions should be undertaken ‘subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party 
concerned’.
41
 The ICRC asserts that customary international humanitarian law applicable in non-
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international armed conflicts reflects the same obligation, with the same limitation: ‘The parties to 
the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for 
civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, 
subject to their right of control.’
42
 In practice, of course, humanitarian organisations seeking to 
deliver humanitarian assistance in non-international armed conflicts will also need the consent of 
any non-State actors who are party to the conflict.
43
 Thus, since the consent of parties to the 
conflict (whether international or non-international) is required and conditions can be imposed 
under both Additional Protocols, access could potentially be denied. Furthermore, to ensure that 
only humanitarian relief supplies were being transported along a safe corridor, a party to the 
conflict could legitimately dismantle a refrigerated lorry carrying medicines and foodstuffs, even if 
that meant that those supplies were damaged.
44
 
 
It is therefore questionable whether a safe zone could ever be considered ‘safe’ without unimpeded 
access by humanitarian actors with relief supplies. This would demand that the specific agreement 
creating the zone went beyond the minimum guarantees established by the law of armed conflict. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide that 
there is an obligation to grant free access to those providing humanitarian assistance: ‘All 
authorities concerned shall grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and 
grant persons engaged in the provision of such assistance rapid and unimpeded access to the 
internally displaced.’
45
 Practice, however, gives no examples of such unhindered free passage as 
of right. 
 
4.2.2 Access to ‘protection’ 
Access is also relevant in a different context. If someone manages to leave the conflict zone and 
travel to another country in search of asylum, his or her claim to refugee status may be denied if 
there is considered to be an internal flight/protection alternative in the home country. Safe zones 
should never be automatically regarded as providing this,
46
 since the lack of clear protection 
guarantees (legal and practical), and the essentially temporary nature of such zones, mean that 
they cannot provide the requisite level of protection, that is, the ability to lead a relatively normal life 
without undue hardship.
47
 However, practice suggests that if there were a UN-administered 
territory in part of a State incorporating the safe zone, that might be sufficient, especially if there 
were only low-level intensity fighting.
48
 It is also implicit in the 2011 EU Qualification Directive 
(recast), where Article 7(1)(b) provides for non-State actors of protection.
49
 Nevertheless, it would 
be necessary to show that the individual could safely access the safe zone; that, if necessary, 
there was a safe corridor to it from the point of entry to the State; and that the individuals’ human 
rights would be upheld. 
 
4.2.3 Access to essential services and resources 
Safe corridors are also a means to provide people otherwise trapped in a conflict zone with access 
to services and resources. The ability to move around in relative safety is necessary to survival, 
whether it is to access medical services or essential provisions. While there may be no explicit laws 
to cover this, ad hoc arrangements negotiated with the parties to the conflict, usually by 
humanitarian actors, can make it possible for those trapped to survive, at least until they can find 
greater safety elsewhere. 
4.3 Ensuring that safe zones are protected  
This section examines how safe zones can be protected; who should be denied access so as to 
enhance the safety of those within the zone; and how to ensure that traditional avenues for 
protection (through the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement) are not 
undermined. 
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4.3.1 Protecting safe zones 
Safe zones and safe corridors rely on parties to the conflict upholding the principle of distinction – 
namely, that civilians and non-fighters must not be the object of an attack. This age-old principle 
applies regardless of whether safe zones exist, but it is obviously fundamental to the idea that safe 
zones could constitute an alternative to flight. However, the fact that civilians frequently flee 
conflicts because their fundamental rights are under threat suggests that the principle of distinction 
has proven inadequate.  
 
Since 1999, the Security Council has included Protection of Civilian (POC) mandates in its 
peacekeeping operations.
50
 These require peacekeepers to protect civilians when they are under 
attack, rather than simply hope that their presence will deter such attacks. The situation in South 
Sudan is a good example of the problem with POC mandates and the security of those within safe 
zones: the Security Council’s unanimously established mandate has not been respected by the 
Transitional Government of National Unity, let alone its opponents. Security Council Resolution 
2327 (2016) presents a series of problems, ranging from external attacks, to security within POC 
sites, to restricting delivery of aid and assistance by humanitarian actors
51
 – and that is 
notwithstanding UNMISS’s authorisation to use all necessary means to uphold its mandate. As 
such, a POC mandate is not enough to justify reliance on a safe zone. 
 
4.3.2 Limiting access to safe zones? 
Another key issue is how to ensure that those living within a safe zone are protected from violence 
perpetrated by others residing there. How should zones and corridors be policed? Ordinarily, the 
State is responsible for security and policing within its borders, but safe zones may be protecting 
those within them against the State itself (especially if the zone has been established by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII). Are peacekeepers to take on this role? If so, this could 
potentially give rise to a conflict of interest, since the same actors would be providing protection as 
well as enforcing the law. In a similar vein, if safe zones are meant to be civilian and humanitarian 
in character, should peacekeepers disarm those entering the safe zone?  
 
Further, by analogy with refugee camps, where people are seriously suspected to have committed 
war crimes, crimes against peace (aggression), crimes against humanity or serious non-political 
crimes, or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, they are excluded 
from refugee protection.
52
 The law on exclusion thus helps to ensure safety within refugee camps 
and maintain their civilian character. Could this concept be applied similarly in safe zones within 
the territory of a country in conflict, since safe zones may at times be envisaged as a substitute for 
seeking refugee status across an international border? While the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement do not have an exclusion clause, and most persons in a safe zone will be internally 
displaced, in order to enhance the civilian and humanitarian character of safe zones, they should 
not be seen as providing sanctuary for those who have previously committed such serious crimes. 
Such persons also make it more likely that parties to the conflict will want to enter the safe zone to 
arrest them, too. Alternatively, given the seriousness of these crimes, could it be argued (by 
analogy with Article 6(5) AP2
53
) that no amnesty would ever be appropriate for such crimes and 
that their perpetrators should not be protected in safe zones? If so, who would police that and 
how? 
There are manifold difficulties in guaranteeing protection within safe zones, both in relation to 
hostile forces outside the zone and perpetrators of violence within it. Safe zones must offer real 
protection to those within them; they must not be a way to ‘warehouse’ people in remote locations 
out of sight.
54
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4.3.3 Ensuring the right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement 
International refugee law and international human rights law provide that the principle of non-
refoulement (which protects people from being returned to a real risk of persecution or other 
serious harm) must be respected for those who seek protection abroad.
55
 There are real concerns 
that safe zones might be proposed, at least in part, as a means to prevent or reduce the number of 
refugees seeking protection elsewhere (especially in the global north).  
 
While safe zones are the least worst alternative to staying in the middle of a conflict, guaranteeing 
the right to seek asylum offers better prospects for protection. It is interesting to note in this 
connection that in the refugee context, law and policy dealing with camps emphasises that 
individuals retain a continuing right to seek asylum.
56
 Just because people are in a safe zone does 
not mean that they lose this entitlement.  
 
Given the difficulties outlined above in ensuring effective protection, safe zones are, at best, a 
temporary fix while the means are found – either by the individuals themselves or with the 
assistance of the international community – to leave the conflict area and obtain international 
protection elsewhere. 
 
4.3.4 Ensuring access to rights 
Safe zones cannot offer full protection akin to peacetime. They may, however, be all that is 
available in a situation of conflict. In such circumstances, what should people living in them expect 
in terms of rights? For the most part, such people will be nationals of the country in which the zone 
is located (and within its jurisdiction). As such, they are entitled to the full complement of human 
rights which the State has agreed to uphold under international law, subject to any emergency 
derogations that may be in place. 
 
Additionally, two useful starting points for any consideration of what further rights ought to be 
guaranteed are the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework contained in annex I of the New York Declaration of 2016.
57
 
 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement reiterate rights to be found in international human 
rights treaties but also tailor some specifically to the needs of IDPs (such as them not being 
‘interned in or confined to a camp’ and having ‘the right to move freely in and out of camps’
58
). 
Moreover, IDPs have the right ‘to leave their country’ and ‘seek asylum in another country’.
59
 The 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in the New York Declaration also lists rights that 
should be available to those in need of protection and assistance after fleeing armed conflict, some 
of which repeat those in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. As such, people in safe 
zones should be guaranteed ‘access to adequate safe drinking water, sanitation, food, nutrition, 
shelter, psychosocial support and health care, including sexual and reproductive health’,
60
 but also 
able to ‘make the best use of their skills and capacities’.
61
  
 
In addition, the New York Declaration’s focus on international solidarity and responsibility-sharing 
provides a framework for considering the viability of safe zones where people cannot cross an 
international border. Protection of people in safe zones can only be effective where the 
international community contributes assistance through troops, aid and/or financial contributions, 
and those responsible for establishing such zones should be willing to receive that assistance and 
the services of impartial humanitarian actors.
62
 By utilising safe corridors, those living in safe zones 
should also be able to access health care, education, employment and legal services. 
 
If States in the global north seek to promote safe zones as an alternative to flight, then the full 
range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights of those who are expected to 
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remain in them must be guaranteed, subject to any emergency derogations (which must, as 
always, be publicly declared by the State in which the conflict is occurring, and be both necessary 
and proportionate). It is not enough simply for a safe zone not to be subject to military attack. 
 
 
5 Issues of responsibility and accountability 
The responsibility of individuals, States, non-State actors and international organisations is too 
large a topic in its own right for more than a very brief overview here, but this overview helps to 
highlight some of the problems that must be addressed if safe zones are to be viable. 
 
Twenty years on, Srebrenica is still a byword for when safe zones go wrong. International criminal 
law may have provided a partial response after the event, but the convictions of the individuals 
concerned have not sent a message around the world that safe zones must be respected. 
Furthermore, the immunity of the UN meant that those murdered in Srebrenica could not have their 
deaths attributed to the organisation’s failure to provide protection in the zones it had established.
63
 
Whether the new POC mandates in peacekeeping operations will change the UN’s approach so 
that it establishes internal compensation mechanisms, as the corollary of immunity before domestic 
courts, remains to be seen. 
 
Another problem is that while consensually-established safe zones offer the best hope of creating 
viable protection, it may not be easy for the international community to enforce standards against 
the country in which they are located, given that its continuing cooperation is essential. Relations 
with the State need to be maintained, since it is effectively guaranteeing the safety of the zone in 
the midst of conflict, and these relations could be jeopardised if the international community is not 
diplomatic in the way it raises concerns about the State’s activities. While there is no 
straightforward answer here, UNHCR’s experience of providing assistance in countries, at the 
same time as having supervisory functions over those countries under Article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention, may be instructive. UNHCR treads a fine line between ensuring that it has a continued 
presence and can maintain access to persons of concern, and still being able to criticise the State. 
Access to safe zones, like access to displaced persons in camps, is central to ensuring protection: 
only though access can the parties to the conflict be held accountable for any violations. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
Safe zones do not provide a complete solution to displacement. They should not be viewed as safe 
locations for returning refugees, except in the rarest of circumstances.
64
 They may be the best 
outcome for people otherwise trapped in conflict zones, but that is all. They do not provide true 
protection as envisaged by international refugee law.  
 
The law on safe zones is underdeveloped and State practice is too erratic and random for them to 
be considered a proper response to humanitarian crises. Safe zones constrain protection, although 
safe corridors may facilitate it. If States in the global north want to spare refugees the dangers of 
irregular flight, then they should establish proper pathways to safety through humanitarian and 
migration channels, and push for peace where conflict is rife. Safe corridors may provide that route 
out, and can also operate to allow people trapped in conflict zones to carry on with their lives, 
accessing work, education, markets and health care. 
 
While safe zones are the least worst alternative in some cases, practice suggests that those 
established consensually by the parties have the greatest chance of providing protection. 
Experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Sudan show why externally-imposed safe 
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zones are less likely to succeed.
65
 The Syrian de-escalation zones proposed by Russia, Turkey 
and Iran are also problematic, and the idea that refugees might be encouraged to return there 
seems faintly ludicrous at this point in time.
66
 To succeed, safe zones must have a civilian, 
humanitarian and neutral character, and humanitarian actors must have access to them to ensure 
protection through respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and to facilitate 
delivery of relief and assistance.  
 
At a minimum, safe zones need to guarantee: 
 
 the right to life (through the principle of distinction); 
 the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; 
 freedom from arbitrary recruitment (to participate in the conflict); 
 personal security, particularly in relation to sexual- and gender-based violence; 
 the right to the highest attainable standard of living and health; 
 access to humanitarian relief and assistance, and access by humanitarian 
organisations; and 
 freedom of movement, including the right to leave the country and seek asylum (with 
full respect for the principle of non-refoulement). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that safe zones created by parties to a conflict, by their own initiative, 
are of a different character from those established at the behest of third States seeking to reduce 
the need for people to seek asylum. Safe zones created for the latter purpose are disingenuous 
when one has regard to the risks to life, personal security and other fundamental rights that arise 
when people are confined to a particular area.  
 
This policy brief has set out the minimum criteria under international law for safe zones to be viable 
and effective. It has shown that even these low-level demands are impossible to guarantee. Safe 
zones, as an alternative to flight, must at least approximate the degree of safety and rights-
accessibility that refugees should receive if they are granted protection across an international 
border – and that is never going to be the case in practice. If States in the global north want to 
avoid the dangers of irregular flight, then they should establish proper pathways to safety through 
humanitarian and migration channels, and press for peace in those areas of the world where 
conflict is rife. As a final note, it is worth bearing in mind that the same States that send aid and 
assistance are the ones that profit from the sale of arms and which wish to benefit from the 
purchase of raw materials that are so often at the root of the conflict.  
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